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The characteristics of the special case assumed by the
classical theory happen not to be those of the economic
society in which we actually live, with the result that its
teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to
apply it to the facts of experience. (CW, 7, p. 3)
Before the General Theory there was neoclassical macroeconomic
theory. Employment and real wages were determined by the demand
and supply of labor; the rate of interest by the demand and
supply of loanable funds. Say's law governed the aggregate
volume of economic activity and the level of money prices was
assumed to be determined by the "quantity of money, . . . its
income-velocity ... by hoarding, by forced saving, by inflation
and deflation et hoc genus omne " (ibid., p. 292). This theory
was taught; it was written and it was believed. It was
"accepted by the city, by statesmen and by the academic world"
(ibid., p. 32). Keynes speculated that
The completeness of the Ricardian victory . . . must have
been due to a complex of suitabilities in the doctrine to
the environment into which it was projected. That it
reached conclusions quite different from what the ordinary
uninstructed person would expect, added, I suppose, to its
intellectual prestige. That its teaching, translated into
practice, was austere and often unpalatable, lent it
virtue. That it was adapted to carry a vast and consistent
logical superstructure, gave it beauty. That it could
explain most social injustice and apparent cruelty as an
inevitable incident in the scheme of progress, and the
attempt to change such things as likely on the whole to do
more harm than good, commended it to authority. That it
afforded a measure of justification to the free activities
of the individual capitalist, attracted to it the support
of the dominant social force behind authority. (ibid., pp.
32-3)
His principal objection to neoclassical theory was that although
its supply and demand—Say's law mode of analysis may have been
relevant to the simpler economic environments of pre-Ricardian
days, it ill suited the economic environment of today—the
economic environment of modern industrial systems of finance
capitalism (CW, 29, pp. 66-102; Torr, 1980, 1988). Keynes
denied this theory's essential beliefs that the aggregate demand
and supply of labor are function of real wages alone; that
employment and real wages are determined in the labor market;
that there exists a market clearing mechanism which establishes
a unigue full employment eguilibrium and that Say's law governs
the level of aggregate economic activity. He found fault with
their belief that
at any given time facts and expectations were assumed to be
given in a definite and calculable form; and risks . . . were
supposed to be capable of an exact actuarial computation. The
calculus of probability . . . was supposed to be capable of
reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as that as
certainty itself. (CW, 14, pp. 112-3)
Keynes "accused classical economic theory of being one of those
pretty polite technigues which tries to deal with the present
by abstracting from the fact that we know very little about the
future" (ibid., p. 115). That neoclassical theory does not
distinguish between risk and true uncertainty strongly suggests
that it is incapable of analyzing the performance of actual
capitalist economies. Because the economic future is uncertain,
entrepreneurs and individuals necessarily are compelled to form
expectations with respect to what the economic climate may be
in both the nearer and more distant futures and they have "no
choice but to be guided by these expectations, if [they are] to
produce at all by processes which occupy time" (CW, 7, p. 46).
In this paper I shall investigate Keynes's critique of the
neoclassical theories of employment and aggregate demand; a
critique that applies equally well to current day neoclassical
aggregate economic theory (Torr, 1988). In the course of
examining Keynes's understanding of the above two branches of
orthodoxy we shall, for contrast, comment briefly on his own
theory of employment and aggregate demand for it is the General
Theory itself which stands today as the most effective dismissal
of neoclassical theory.
I. The Neoclassical Theory of Employment.
The neoclassical theory of employment which Keynes dismembered
assumes an environment in which competitive pricing, diminishing
returns and flexible money wages and prices obtain. The three
operative assumptions of this theory are a labor demand
function, Nd = f(w/p), f'< 0, a labor supply function, Ns =
g(w/p), g'> 0, and a market clearing assumption, N„ = Nd . (cf .
,
Fig. 1)
A remarkable but little noted feature of this model of
employment is that both sides of the market, labor and capital,
cooperate to establish mutually advantageous levels of
employment and real wages (Torr, 1988). Labor and capital
possess equal shares of market power in the sense that either
side can effect changes in employment and real wages. Labor
could increase employment, decrease "voluntary" unemployment,
by the simple expedient of expressing a willingness to work for
lower real wages. Entrepreneurs too could raise employment by
increasing the marginal productivity of labor through the
acquisition of new, technically superior capital equipment,
improved management and so forth. Keynes understood these
characteristics of neoclassical theory and knew that they did
not apply to an entrepreneur economy (his term for the real
world of 20th century capitalism). In Keynes's theory,
employment and real wages are determined in the product market
by producers' short-term expectations of sale proceeds. With
expectations formed, entrepreneurs then unilaterally decide
their levels of employment and output. Workers, who do not have
access to the means of production, are left in the unenviable
position of having to wait until it well suits an entrepreneur
to offer them jobs. In the real world of today, employment
decisions are squarely in the hands of the entrepreneurs. The
entrepreneur economy is anything but a "cooperative economy"
(Keynes's term for the supply-demand neutral money environment
neoclassical writers assume).
A second significant feature of the classical model is that
labor and capital receive "predetermined shares of the aggregate
output" (CW, 29, pp. 70-76). Predetermined in the sense that
the shares accruing to capital and labor are settled before the
product workers produce is placed on the market for the
uncertain sale proceeds it may fetch. To illustrate, the area
(A+B) of Fig. 1 depicts the volume of output produced by N e
workers. In preordained fashion, in advance of marketing
product, share B accrues to labor, share A to capital. If we
move our eyes along the marginal product of labor function, Nd ,
we see differing levels of real wages and employment producing
differing but still predestined shares of output. In sum,
orthodox theory assumes that relative shares are mechanically
settled with no regard given to the sale proceeds the produced
product might fetch when taken to market.
Keynes easily saw the flaw in this piece of "real" economics.
The General Theory informs us that society's income, the object
subject to distribution in an entrepreneur economy, necessarily
equals the dollar volume of aggregate demand. Thus before there
can be an income to distribute, labor must be hired, product
produced and then marketed . The resulting aggregate flow of
realized sale proceeds is then distributed to labor and capital.
In view of the fact that the always uncertain flow of effective
demand is subject to fluctuation, the income shares accruing to
labor and capital too are uncertain, subject to fluctuation and
can only be determined after the receipt of aggregate sale
proceeds. An entrepreneur economy clearly does not, physically
cannot, distribute income shares in predetermined fashion.
A third surprising feature of orthodox theory is its criterion
for increasing employment and output. For an additional worker
to be hired all that is required is that the product of the
added worker have an "exchange value . . . sufficient to balance
the disutility of the additional employment" (ibid., p. 78).
For a firm to expand employment it is only necessary that the
expected product of the additional worker exceed the real wage
cost of employing an additional hand. Keynes wrote that
The classical theory supposes that the readiness of the
entrepreneur to start up a productive process depends on
the amount of value in terms of product which he expects to
fall to his share; i.e., that only an expectation of more
product for himself will induce him to offer more
employment. But in an entrepreneur economy this is a wrong
analysis of the nature of business calculation. An
entrepreneur is interested, not in the amount of product,
but in the amount of money which [he expects] will fall to
his share. He will increase his output if by doing so he
expects to increase his money profit, even though this
profit represents a smaller quantity of product than before
(ibid.
,
p. 82) .
The difference between the orthodox and Keynes's criteria for
expanding production is the difference between Say's law and
Keynes's theory of aggregate demand. Say's law largely
guarantees a market for society's output so that entrepreneurs
in making their employment decisions need only pay attention to
the balance between real wages and the marginal products of
labor. They need pay no attention to the real world of
problematic markets and fluctuating sale proceeds. The need not
torment themselves wondering whether the output they produce
will be purchased.
Real world entrepreneurs, on the other hand, must focus on the
ever changing markets for their products. Hence, an
entrepreneur working in a capitalist economy will hire
additional workers only if he holds the expectation that the
added product produced will be sold at a profit. Conversely,
an entrepreneur would not hire an additional worker even if the
worker's expected marginal product exceeded the real wage by a
good margin if the entrepreneur held the expectation that the
additional product could not be sold at a profit. Keynes noted
(CW, 7
,
p. 31) that "The insufficiency of effective demand will
inhibit the process of production in spite of the fact that the
marginal product of labour still exceeds in value the marginal
disutility of employment."
A. The Classical Labor Supply Function.
Keynes's criticism of the orthodox labor supply function is
based on the obvious real world fact that the supply of labor
is not a unigue function of real wages.
For if the supply of labour is not a function of real wages
as its sole variable, their argument breaks down entirely
and leaves the guestions of what the actual employment will
be guite indeterminate . . . unless the supply of labour is
a function of real wages alone, their supply curve for
labour will shift bodily with every movement of prices,
(ibid.
, pp. 8-9) .
His critigue of the neoclassical labor supply function is
sguarely grounded on the observable facts that money wages are
downwardly sticky while real wages are, to a limited extent,
downwardly flexible. Keynes knew that labor would resist
reductions of money wages but would not resist moderate
reductions of real wages when produced by modest increases in
consumer goods prices.
Every trade union will put up some resistance to a cut in
money-wages, however small. But ... no trade union would
dream of striking on every occasion of a rise in the cost
of living, (ibid., p. 15)
Keynes did not assume that money wages are downwardly sticky.
Sticky money wages are in the General Theory simply because he
knew that in capitalist economies, wages in terms of money are
in fact downwardly sticky. But what accounts for labor's
resistance to money wage cuts? Do workers not understand the
axioms of orthodox theory? Are they afflicted with that most
dreadful of classical diseases, "the money illusion"? Are
sticky money wages due to trade union market power? Not at all.
Keynes nicely explained the institutional details and rational
human behavior which produces downwardly sticky money wages.
Since there is imperfect mobility of labour, and wages do
not tend to an exact equality of net advantage in different
occupations, any individual or group of individuals who
consent to a reduction of money-wages relatively to others,
will suffer a relative reduction in real wages, which is a
sufficient justification for them to resist it. On the
other hand, it would be impracticable to resist every
reduction of real wages, due to a change in the purchasing-
power of money which affects all workers alike. (CW, 7, p.
14)
Here Keynes provided the critical insight; workers make relative
comparisons, not just absolute comparisons. That labor is less
than perfectly mobile means that all workers of a given sex,
skill, intelligence, etc., do not pursue the same occupation and
earn the very same wage. The aggregate labor force is composed
of a vast number of differing occupations; each occupation
carrying its own skill, knowledge and training requirements.
The wage rates earned by these differing groups position them
on the scale of all occupations pursued and incomes earned. The
less well paid groups lie at the bottom of this scale of social
worth where pay, prestige and feelings of general well being are
lacking and individual worth not fully appreciated. Capitalism
would seem to offer these workers little more than a life of
dreary work and privation. Life for workers positioned at the
top of the scale is much better. Society has recognized their
worth, and their pay relative to all other workers confirms
their belief. They pursue more interesting occupations which
require finer skills, greater knowledge and higher degrees of
training. For them the economic system seems to be functioning
well. Since workers do make relative comparisons, no group of
workers would care to step forward and be the first to accept
or be forced to accept a pay cut and so yield position, income,
prestige and a feeling of general well being to other groups of
workers. No worker or group of workers would care to slip down
a notch or two on society's scale of social worth. (c.f.,
Veblen, 1987)
Relative positions, however, would not be altered if all money
wages and salaries could simultaneously be reduced by equal
percentage amounts. If this could be done, workers would be
freed of their fears of losing position and so perhaps would not
resist moderate reductions of their money wages.
If every one was accepting a similar reduction [of money
wages] at the same time, the cost of living would fall, so
that the lower money wage would represent nearly the same
real wage as before. But in fact, there is no machinery for
effecting a simultaneous reduction. (CW, 9, p. 211).
"But in fact, there is no machinery for effecting simultaneous
reduction [s ] " of money wages. They are downwardly sticky, loath
to fall, simply because those workers who are the first to
accept or are forced to accept reductions of money wages have
neither the knowledge nor assurance that other workers would be
asked or forced to suffer similar reductions. Thus for a
particular group of workers to accept a lower money wage would
mean accepting a reduction of their standard of living relative
to that enjoyed by all other workers, And this is sufficient
reason for them to resist all attempts to reduce their money
wages
.
The stickiness of money wages is reinforced by the fact that in
the unionized sector of the labor force, money wages are
bilaterally determined and contractually fixed for shorter and
longer periods of time. Sticky wages then limit both the upward
and downward flexibility of prices and thus serve to stabilize
the value of money. In support of Keynes's argument, Hicks
(1974, p. 65) adds that employers are
"reluctant to cut wages, simply because of unemployment;
for if they did so they would alienate those whom they
continue to employ ... [thus] 'stickiness' is not a matter
of 'money illusion'; it is a matter of continuity. It would
of course be reinforced by the standard rates of trade
unionism; but there would be a tendency in the same
direction, even apart from trade union pressure."
All in all, money wages are downwardly sticky for eminently
rational individual and social reasons.
Keynes added that the combined effect of downwardly sticky money
wages but downwardly fluid real wages nullified the neoclassical
labor supply function. Since labor does not ordinarily resist
modest reductions in real wages when produced by increases in
consumer prices, it follows that the orthodox labor supply
function will "shift bodily with every movement of prices . .
.
[and] ... if the supply of labor is not a function of real wages
as its sole variable, their argument breaks down entirely and
leaves the guestion of what the actual employment will be quite
indeterminate" (CW, 7, pp. 8-9).
Figure 2 illustrates Keynes's argument. Let N B and (w/p) x be the
initial labor supply function and real wage rate and N
t
the
quantity of labor supplied at the given real wage. Holding the
money wage, w, constant, assume a modest increase in consumer
prices sufficient to drive the real wage down to (w/p) . With
relative positions undisturbed, the quantity of labor supplied
at this lower real wage (point f) will be the same as that
available at the initial higher real wage, (w/p)^ What has
happened is that the labor supply curve has shifted "bodily"
downward to N' s as a conseguence of a mild inflation of consumer
prices
.
Keynes's conclusion is unavoidable. The supply of labor is not
a sole function of the real wage. Thus neoclassical theory
lacks a valid labor supply function and this shocking egregious
lacuna alone suffices to discredit their simple supply-demand
theory of employment and real wages.
The classical labor supply assumption also fails the test of
realism on other significant but common place grounds. Given
money wages, their theory states that if consumer prices were
to rise a bit and so produce decreased real wages, numbers of
workers (blue collar, white collar and perhaps salaried managers
too) would throw down their tools, walk off their jobs and
retreat home to "enjoy" a leisurely but worthless life of
voluntary unemployment on the dole. The orthodox labor supply
assumption also implies "that all those who are now unemployed
though willing to work at the current wage will withdraw the
offer of their labour in the event of a small rise in the cost
of living" (ibid., p. 13). But this cannot be true.
Orthodox economists seemed blind to the humdrum fact that
workers, blue and white collar alike, have positions to
maintain. They have families to support, children to educate,
mortgages to service and pension funds to nurture and other
10
obligations to meet as well. For workers to walk off their jobs
voluntarily would be to abdicate their responsibilities to their
families and to lose the respect and affections of their
families, relatives, friends, neighbors and fellow workers. A
small rise in consumer prices will not send a margin of workers
marching into the economic and social miasma of voluntary
unemployment. Workers will do may things in response to
decreased real wages. They will seek over-time work, additional
part-time jobs, increased family participation in the labor
force and industrial action to name a few. What they will not
do is voluntarily throw up their jobs in exchange for a life of
daylight hours spent on park benches or in library reading rooms
patiently awaiting a rise in the value of money. From this
perspective, one can legitimately question the classical concept
of "voluntary" unemployment. The real world has observed
involuntary unemployed workers, retired workers, debilitated
workers, casual workers and part-time workers. But has the
world ever observed a regular member of the work force
voluntarily unemployed because of a modest rise of consumer
prices; voluntarily unemployed in strict obedience to the
postulates of orthodox theory? With her eyes focused squarely
on the real world, Joan Robinson noted (1937, p. 7) that
the individual breadwinner without private means can never
be in a position to refuse to work because real wages are
too low to be worth the effort. He must earn what he can
get or starve altogether. Even if he could retain his right
to the dole after refusing a job at the ruling wage rate,
he would find that the real dole had fallen as much as the
real wage.
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B. Keynes's Critique of the Neoclassical Market Clearing
Assumption.
The orthodox market clearing mechanism implies that a reduction
of money wages would reduce real wages and increase employment.
Keynes did not agree. He opened his Chapter 19 analysis of the
economic efficacy of money wage reductions with the observation
that
It was not possible ... to discuss this matter fully until
our own theory had been developed. For the consequences of
a change in money-wages are quite complicated. A reduction
in money-wages is quite capable in certain circumstances of
affording a stimulus to output, as classical theory
supposes. My difference from this theory is primarily a
difference of analysis. (CW, 7
,
p. 257)
Keynes noted that lower money wages would increase employment
if they were " accompanied by the same aggregate effective demand
as before . . . [but] the precise question at issue is whether the
reduction in money-wages will or will not be accompanied by the
same aggregate effective demand as before" (ibid., p. 259).
Since employment is a direct function of effective demand, it
follows that for reduced wages to produce additional jobs, they
must do so by directly or indirectly stimulating effective
demand. In order to stimulate demand, lower money wages would
have to produce increases in either (a) the propensity to
consume, (b) the marginal efficiency of capital or (c) reduce
the rate of interest. With this clarified, Keynes then
12
conducted his detailed analysis of the effects money wage cuts
would have on the propensity to consume, the marginal efficiency
of capital, the rate of interest, the balance of trade, the
terms of trade, business confidence and the increased burden of
debt deflation visits (ibid., pp. 262-71). On the basis of his
rather lengthy analysis, he concluded that falling money wages
would have little effect, plus or minus, on the volume of
aggregate demand and the level of employment.
There is, therefore, no ground for the belief that a
flexible wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of
continuous full employment;—any more than for the belief
that an open-market monetary policy is capable, unaided, of
achieving this result. The economic system cannot be made
self-adjusting along these lines. (ibid., p. 267)
In sum, to advance the idea that if only money wages and prices
could flex downward, full employment would be gained is a hope
which cannot be sustained. Rather than automatically securing
a fully employed economy, a general deflation of wages and
prices would bring
widespread insolvencies and defaults and the collapse of a
large part of the financial structure; after which we should
all start again . . . having suffered a period of waste and
disturbance and social injustice, and a general
rearrangement of private fortunes and the ownership of
wealth. (CW, 9, p. 157)
Keynes strongly favored a stable money. To achieve this goal
he recommended that employment be stabilized at some high level,
but not so high as to bring on inflation. In the short-run he
favored completely rigid money wages; that money wages should
be both upwardly and downwardly rigid. Over a longer-run period
Keynes reasoned that it would be in society's best interests if
the general level of money wages were to rise along with the
13
growth of labor productivity. The alternate wage-price policy
of stabilizing money wages and allowing prices to fall in line
with rising labor productivity wold not suit debt encumbered
capitalist economies.
In brief, Keynes saw that the flexible wage-price market
mechanism assumptions and policy prescriptions of neoclassical
theory cannot be applied to an entrepreneur economy. Rather
than generate full employment, a general deflation of wages and
prices could well plunge the economy into a crisis of reduced
consumer and investment spending, increased unemployment,
growing uncertainty, social unrest and social injustice and an
increasingly fragile financial structure. Furthermore, Keynes's
theory demonstrated that sticky money wages are not responsible
for involuntary unemployment. Rather sticky money wages are
essential to the stability of money values and, indeed, to the
stability of capitalist systems. (Lerner, 1953, pp. 354-85;
Wells, 1978).
C. The Neoclassical Labor Demand Function.
Through the first 16 chapters of the General Theory Keynes
assumed competitive pricing and diminishing returns. Since he
did make these two provisional assumptions, Keynes was bound to
render a qualified acceptance of what he called "the first
postulate" of the neoclassical theory of employment—their labor
demand function, (N d , Fig. 1).
In emphasising our point of departure from the classical
system, we must not overlook an important point of
agreement. For we shall maintain the first postulate as
heretofore, subject only to the same qualifications as in
the classical theory; and we must pause, for a moment, to
consider what this involves . (CW, 7, p. 17, emphasis added)
What "this" (the orthodox labor demand function) involves is
14
that "with a given organization, equipment and technique, real
wages and the volume of output (and hence employment) are
uniquely correlated so that ... an increase in employment can
only occur to the accompaniment of a decline in the rate of real
wages" (ibid, p. 17) Again, on the same page, Keynes added that
"the real wage earned by a unit of labour has a unique (inverse)
correlation with the volume of employment." Twice Keynes
stressed the real wage—employment relation, the neoclassical
labor demand function, to be nothing more than a correlation!
But if labor supply and demand do not determine employment and
real wages, how then are these two magnitudes settled in an
entrepreneur economy?
Keynes solved this problem with his own totally original theory
of employment; a theory applicable to the world of today. It
commences with this critical insight.
For every value of N [employment] there is a corresponding
marginal productivity of labour in the wage-goods
industries; and it is this which determines the real wage,
(ibid., p. 29, emphasis added)
It is "this," the level of employment which determines real
wages, "not the other way around." But if employment determines
real wages, what then determines the level of employment?
Keynes answered that "The propensity to consume and the rate of
new investment spending determine between them the volume of
employment, and the volume of employment is uniquely related to
a given level of [real] wages—not the other way around" (ibid.,
p. 30).
But Keynes's theory of employment contains much more highly
15
original economics than just these few critically important
sentences reveal. His detailed theory of employment is grounded
not on a set of assumptions , but on his acquired knowledge of
the actual behavior of entrepreneurs and workers. The agents
in Keynes's theory, workers and entrepreneurs, live, think and
act in the real world of today. His theory opens with the
following observation.
All production is for the purpose of ultimately satisfying
a consumer. Time usually elapses . . . between the incurring
of costs by the producer . . . and the purchase of the output
... by the consumer. Meanwhile the entrepreneur has to form
the best expectations he can as to what the consumers will
be prepared to pay when he is ready to supply them . . .and
he has no choice but to be guided by these expectations, if
he is to produce at all by processes which occupy time.
( ibid.
,
p. 46)
Keynes divided entrepreneurial expectations into two broad
categories; short-term expectation and long-term expectation.
Short-term expectations are formed by both the producers of
consumer goods and services and the producers of capital goods.
These expectations have to do with "the price which a
manufacturer can expect to get for his 'finished' output at the
time when he commits himself to starting the process which will
produce it; output being * finished' ... when it is ready to be
used or sold to a second party" (ibid., p. 46). Long term
expectation "is concerned with what the entrepreneur can hope
to earn in the shape of future returns if he purchases . . .
x finished' output as an addition to his capital equipment. In
short, both the producers of consumer and capital goods form
short-term expectations while it is the purchasers of newly
produced capital goods who form long-term expectations.
Keynes adds that each individual firm's employment and output
16
decisions will be determined by its short-terra expectations;
expectations as to the sale-proceeds its output will fetch when
ready for market and expectations as to costs of production on
differing possible scales of production. But expectations alone
do not determine the actual or "today's" level of employment.
Keynes added that the volume of employment is given by the
intersection between the ... [expected proceeds function] ...
and the aggregate supply function; for it is at this point that
the entrepreneur's expectation of profit will be maximised"
(ibid., p. 25). Thus the actual levels of employment are
determined by entrepreneurs who adjust their rates of employment
until the aggregate supply price of their respective outputs
equals their expectations of sale proceeds. In essence the
intersection of the aggregate supply function, Z, with the
aggregate of expected sale proceeds, E(P), determines the actual
volume of employment and the attendant real wage. Keynes
defined this point of intersection to be "the effective demand"
( ibid.
,
p. 25)
.
Short-term expectations, Keynes wrote, are largely based on
businesses' recently realized sale results.
[In] practice the process of revision of short-term
expectation is a gradual and continuous one, carried on
largely in the light of realised results . . . Thus in
practice there is a large overlap between the effects on
employment of the realised sale-proceeds of recent output
and those of the [expected] sale-proceeds from current
input, (ibid., p. 51)
Figure 3 provides an outline of Keynes's theory of employment,
output and real wages. This diagram plots his aggregate demand
or realized sale proceeds function, (C+I), his aggregate supply
function, Z, and the "today's" value of entrepreneurs' expected
sale proceeds, EtP)^ With Keynes's complete set of three
17
aggregate functions in place, we may describe the manner in
which his theory determines the actual or today's level of
employment and output and the short-run eguilibrium value of
these two variables. First , the intersection of the mass of
expected sale-proceeds, E(P) W with the aggregate supply
function, Z, at point a, the point of "effective demand,"
determines the actual level of employment, H 1 . Next, after some
periods of time have elapsed, the realized sale-proceeds fetched
by the sale of product the employed labor force is given by the
aggregate demand function, (C+I). With (C+I) shown to be lying
above E(P)!, the actual or realized flow of proceeds belonging
to N
x
workers exceeds entrepreneurs' expectations by the amount
(al ) . The excess of realized sale-proceeds and the attendant
rundown of inventories prompts entrepreneurs to revise upwards
both their short-term expectations and thus their rates of
employment and output.
The revisions of short-term expectations will shift the mass of
expected proceeds upward and so bring it closer to the aggregate
demand function. With this done, the actual level of employment
will move closer to the equilibrium value as determined by the
intersection of the aggregate demand and supply functions at
point e. Provided the aggregate demand function remains
unchanged, the continuing revision of expectations and
employment will bring the economy to a full short-run
equilibrium; a position defined by the fact that E(P) = (C+I)
= Z as shown by point e. Keynes observed that it was unlikely
that such a position of equilibrium would be achieved, and if
achieved, would prevail for long. The chief reason he found for
equilibrium being the exception rather than the rule was the
transient nature of long-term expectations and the effect
shifting expectations have on day-to-day levels of investment
spending and hence aggregate demand. Long-term expectations
"may change so frequently that the actual level of employment
has never had time ... to settle down" (ibid., p. 48).
18
In entrepreneur economies it is aggregate demand which
determines employment, output and society's flow of income.
Both employment and the real wages are determined in the markets
for final output; they are not settled in a labor market.
Finally, we note that the real wage lies at the tail end of a
time consuming causal train of expectations formed, workers
hired, product produced and then marketed. Keynes's theory of
employment well illustrates the futility of attempting to
understand the workings of entrepreneur economies from an
orthodox perspective (Dow, 1985).
II. The Neoclassical* Theory of Aggregate Demand; Say's Law and
their Theory of the Rate of Interest.
A. Say's Law
If, however, this is not the true law relating the aggregate
demand and supply functions, there is a vitally important
chapter of economic theory which remains to be written and
without which all discussions concerning the volume of
aggregate employment are futile. (CW, 7, p. 26)
The classical theory of employment closes with the labor market
in full employment equilibrium. Workers have been hired and are
on the job producing a capacity flow of final product. But with
this remarkable feat so easily, so axiomatically , accomplished
a problem arises. Will the product produced by the fully
employed labor force find a market? Will there be a market, a
continuous market over time, real time, historical time, for the
daily flow of goods and services which the neoclassical model
of employment churns out? To solve this critical marketing
problem, the orthodox writers simply laid down a pair of
assumptions; Say's law and their flow supply and demand theory
of the rate of interest. Together these assumptions create a
market sufficient to purchase the economy's flow of final
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product. But together these assumptions impose a highly
restrictive theoretically unacceptable income expenditure agenda
on both consumers and investors.
Say's law, or at least that version of Say's law which Keynes
winnowed from assorted neoclassical writers, states that supply
creates its own demand in the "sense that the whole costs of
production must necessarily be spent in the aggregate, directly
or indirectly, on purchasing the product" (ibid., p. 18). This
law, the neoclassical theory of aggregate demand, compels the
aggregate demand price of final output to equal its aggregate
supply price. It requires that income be spent solely on final
product; not so much as a dollar may be spent purchasing assets!
Orthodox economists fully realized that not all of society's
income was directly spent purchasing consumer goods, a part was
saved. To close this potential expenditure gap on GNP account,
they laid down a second assumption; their theory of the rate of
interest. Keynes (ibid., p. 19) identified this theory to be
part and parcel of Say's law.
As a corollary of the same doctrine, it has been supposed
that any individual act of abstaining from consumption
necessarily leads to, and amounts to the same thing as,
causing the labour and commodities thus released from
supplying consumption to be invested in the production of
capital wealth.
Income not directly spent on consumer goods is borrowed by
capitalists who then spend the whole of society's saving
purchasing newly produced capital goods. The mechanism which
transforms saving into investment spending is their supply-
demand theory of interest (Section B below).
In sum, Say's law and its corollary assume that money is
neutral; that the aggregate demand price of output is determined
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by its aggregate supply price and that saving determines
investment in the sense that income not spent purchasing
consumers goods is spent solely on newly produced capital goods.
Though the orthodox theory of a self adjusting fully employed
economy neither admits nor can explain the causes of booms and
slumps, the professors of this theory were alert to the non-
axiomatic fact that recessions and recoveries do occur in
capitalist economies. Rather than attempt a theoretical
explanation of cycles they remained content in their belief that
they were due simply to
miscalculation, or insufficient time to make the proper
arrangements, or of a stupid obstinacy about the terms on
the part either of the firms or of the factors of
production. In fact unemployment could only be due to one
of these aberrations of a temporary or otherwise non-
fundamental character such as classical theory has always
envisaged as a possibility. (CW, 29, p. 97)
In short, they explained booms and slumps be assuming a wrench
had been thrown into the working mechanisms of the economy. In
their view recessions and recoveries were mere transitory
states; full employment, their model insists, is the norm. That
the neoclassical theory of aggregate demand is incapable of
analyzing booms and slumps, the common experience of
entrepreneur economies, strongly suggests that this theory
cannot be applied to the real world of today. Their theory is
not appropriate simply because it does not fit the facts of
modern capitalist economies.
Perhaps the most crippling aspect of Say's law in particular and
neoclassical economics in general is their otherworldly
assumption that money is neutral; that all income earned on GNP
account is spent on final product. It is as if the factors of
production were remunerated with a very peculiar currency which
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could only be spent on GNP account; a currency incapable of
purchasing a rare book, a promising horse, a piece of land, a
Rodin. Though Say's law requires a "final product only
currency," Keynes (ibid, p. 85) pointed out that such
restrictive currencies are not to be found in capitalist
economies. "It is of the essence of an entrepreneur economy
that the thing (or things) in terms of which the factors of
production are rewarded can be spent on something which is not
current output." In the real world of entrepreneur economies
money is spent, and, contrary to Say's law, money is spent
purchasing everything that is for sale . Money from whatever
source it may have come is spent on final product, spent
purchasing assets, donated to charities and is taxed.
Consumers, for example, may purchase new bicycles and secondhand
bicycles, and they may purchase these objects with monies earned
on income account or monies gained from the sale of assets.
Businesses too may purchase new capital goods or secondhand
capital goods with monies earned on income account, monies
gained from the sale of assets, and monies borrowed from
commercial banks. Clearly, the special currency Say's law,
neoclassical economics, requires is a currency not to be found
in the observable world of capitalism.
Obviously if income earned is spent, in small or large part,
purchasing assets and if final product is purchased in small or
large part with monies gained from the sale of assets, then
Say's law most certainly is not a "true law" relating income and
expenditure. Indeed it could not have been a "true law" well
before the time of J. B. Say. The centuries preceding J.B. Say
saw land, structures, cattle, ships, warehouses and numerous
other assets exchanged for money. Doubtless the English
professors of orthodox theory themselves, in direct violation
of Say's law, must now and then surreptitiously slipped the odd
shilling or two from their University stipends to purchase
secondhand bicycles, wood burning stoves, books, a tea cozy or
22
any number of the other vast multitude of useful secondhand
article which daily were exchanged in markets strewn across the
breadth of England.
Despite the numerous practical failures Say's law suffers it is
Keynes's General Theory which provides the required theoretical
critique of this strained piece of economics. His outright
dismissal of this law was simple and to the point. It begins
with this crucial observation. "For the proposition that supply
creates its own demand, I shall substitute the proposition that
expenditure creates its own income, i.e., an income just
sufficient to meet the expenditure" (ibid., pp. 80-1). Keynes
had it right. Income is expenditure, the income of one is the
expenditure of others. Wage, interest, rent and profit payments
are the expenditures of businesses whose incomes, in turn, are
the expenditures of those who purchase their products. Thus it
is the aggregate demand price of output which determines the
dollar flow of society's income. Income is tethered to
aggregate demand, "not the other way around."
With the expenditure-income nexus correctly specified, Keynes's
theory of aggregate demand came fully into play. This theory
states that realized sale proceeds, the aggregate demand price
of output, need not equal the ex post aggregate supply price of
output. Over time aggregate demand fluctuates independently of
ex post income and so rarely equals ex post income (CW, 7, pp.
47-50; 14, pp 175-89; Davidson, 1978). The fluctuating flows
of aggregate demand that capitalist economies experience
generate anew differing flows of income. That aggregate demand
determines income, that income fluctuates in response to
changing levels of spending on GNP account and that demand
fluctuates independently of ex post income is the nucleus of
Keynes's theoretical dismissal of Say's law.
To illustrate his anti-Say's law argument, we begin with an
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entrepreneur economy in equilibrium. Aggregate demand, Y d ,
aggregate supply, Y8/ and aggregate income, Y lt equal one another
and saving, S, equals investment, I. On the surface, this
convenient equilibrium position looks very much like a Says's
law world; Yd = Y L and I = S. But of course it is not a Say's
law world in which we live. To show that it is not, suppose
that in light of revised long-term expectations, businesses
reduce their investment spending by $X per unit of time. This
reduction in spending promptly reduces businesses' realized
sale proceeds and society's income by $X per unit of time. Thus
"today's" aggregate spending and "today's" aggregate income both
fall short of "yesterday's expenditure and income and Say's law
is shattered. This of course could not happen in a Say's law
world but it does happen in entrepreneur economies.
Keynes, borrowing from R. F. Kahn, found that the attendant
multiplier decrease in aggregate demand following a decrease in
investment spending would further reduce society's aggregate
demand, income and employment. With the multiplier contraction
completed, the decreased flow of aggregate income will have
reduced society's saving by an amount equal to the decreased
flow of investment spending. Hence, investment spending
determines the level of society's savings; "not the other way
around.
"
B. The Neoclassical Theory of Interest.
The reader will readily appreciate that the problem here
under discussion is a matter of the most fundamental
theoretical importance. For the economic principle, on
which the practical advice of economists has been almost
invariably based, has assumed, in effect, that cet. par. ,
a decrease in spending will tend to lower the rate of
interest and an increase in investment spending to raise
it. But if what these two quantities determine is, not the
rate of interest, but the aggregate volume of employment,
then our outlook on the mechanism of the economic system
will be profoundly changed. (CW, 7, pp. 184-85)
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The orthodox theory of interest Keynes examined assumes full
employment and, of course, neutral money. It rules out
uncertainty, doubt and disappointment so that
"there is no occasion to hold inactive [money] balances, and
prices must be constantly at a level which, merely to satisfy
the transactions motive and without leaving any surplus to be
absorbed by the precautionary and speculative motives, causes
the whole stock of money to be worth a rate of interest equal
to the marginal efficiency capital which corresponds to full
employment" (CW, 14, p. 107).
Professor Dillard (1954, p. 6) explained that money is neutral
in the sense that it does not affect the essential nature
of transactions— it is not allowed to enter into and help
to determine motives and decisions which influence the
volume of output. Money is important only in the sense that
it is more efficient than barter.
The neoclassical theory of interest consists of the usual triad
of supply-demand equations; a demand for loanable funds, a
supply of loanable funds and, of course, a market clearing
equation (c.f., Fig. 3). This three equation model is a prime
example of neoclassical theory for it well illustrates "The
unreality of the [neoclassical] x real' approach" (Dillard,
1954, p 5). It asserts that the price of money is determined
just as the price of any ordinary commodity is settled, by flow
supply and demand equations. It argues that an increased
propensity to save, unless offset by additional investment
spending, will lower interest rates and call forth added
investment spending. Similarly, increased investment spending
will raise the rate of interest unless offset by added saving.
But best of all, the bond rate of interest and the matching of
the flows of saving and investment obtains "without the
necessity for any special intervention or grandmotherly care on
the part of the monetary authority" (CW, 7, p. 177). It is a
wonderfully simple theory; easy to learn, easy to teach. But
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can it be applied to an entrepreneur economy?
Keynes quickly pointed out a fundamental flaw of this theory
He noted that
The psychological time-preferences of an individual require
two sets of decisions to carry they out completely. The
first ... I have called the propensity to consume which . .
.
determines for each individual how much of his income he
will consume and how much he will reserve in some form of
command over future consumption . . . But . . . there is a
further decision which awaits him, namely, in what form he
will hold the command over future consumption which he has
reserved, whether out of his current income or from previous
savings. (ibid, p. 166)
An individual living in an entrepreneur economy must select the
form in which to hold his saving. He may, for example, allocate
his saving (and reallocate his savings) between capital safe,
income uncertain, highly liquid, short-term assets such as NOW
accounts, Treasury bills, etc., and less liquid, capital unsafe,
long-term assets such as bonds. The allocation of saving and
the reallocation of savings between money and bonds depends on
the degree of the individual's liquidity preference, "where an
individual's liquidity preference is given by a schedule of the
amounts of his resources . . . which he will wish to retain in the
form of money in different sets of circumstances" (ibid, p.
166) .
Orthodox theory failed to recognize this necessary second step
savers must take. This failure, the product of their neutral
money assumption, proved fatal. Fatal because neoclassical
theory requires that all saving be placed in newly issued bonds.
Income saved could not be place in money or near money for that
would violate Say's law. It could not be placed in land,
existing structures sheep or even a single Epstein. Nor could
saving be placed in secondhand intangible assets such as
corporate bonds, common stock, Treasury bonds or other existing
26
debt instruments which daily are traded in entrepreneur
economies. Savers can purchase new issues only! The implied
absence of a secondhand market for bonds means that savers would
be required to hold the new issues they purchase until death do
them part, until either the bond or its owner expired.
The absence of a secondhand bond market would make new issues
a highly illiquid unsuitable store of value; an unsuitable
vehicle for transferring purchasing power to unknowable future
dates. In the absence of secondhand markets for bonds, the
market for new issues would shrink dramatically for it has long
been recognized that a market for new issues depends on the
existence of robust, well organized markets in secondhand bonds
(Davidson, 1978). Indeed, the major function of bond markets
is to make a market for new issues and to maintain the liquidity
of these issues as they mature. Notwithstanding the axioms of
neoclassical economics, if a secondhand market did not in fact
exist, one would quickly come into being.
That entrepreneur economies do have well organized bond markets
falsifies both the orthodox theory of interest and their
assumption that money is neutral. The secondhand bond markets
in New York, London and other major financial centers physically
proves afresh each trading day that bond prices and hence long
rates of interest are determined hourly by bull-bear buy and
sell orders. Compared to the mass of secondhand bonds traded,
the daily flow of new issues is but an insignificant drop in the
ocean of existing issues traded (Townshend, 1937). Necessarily
the price of new issues will be determined by the prices of
secondhand bonds of similar maturity and quality. It would seem
that in developing their theory the neoclassical writers chose
the wrong trading instrument, new issues rather than existing
issues, and the wrong market, a "new issues only" rather than
the bond exchanges found in entrepreneur economies.
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The presence of secondhand bond markets also falsifies the
orthodox stricture that saving be spent in toto on new issues.
In an entrepreneur economy, income saved may purchase new
issues, but it may also purchase existing bonds, bills or any
number of other tangible and intangible assets. A trader, for
example, may finance his purchases of new issues with moneys
gained from selling assets, from bank loans or moneys form other
source whatever they may be. The issuers of new bonds care only
that their bonds be exchanged for a satisfactory sum of money.
They care not one whit whether the sale proceeds consist of
moneys saved, moneys gained from the sale of assets, or moneys
gained from running drugs. Sellers of goods, services and
assets have absolutely no interest in the recent transaction
histories of their sundry sale proceeds. On its own logically
tight grounds, the orthodox theory makes sense. But on the
parade ground of the real world of entrepreneur economies it is
a "nonsense theory" (CW, 7, p. 179).
The neoclassical neutral money requirement that proceeds from
the sale of new issues be spent solely on new capital goods too
is a foolish piece of "real" economics. Just as savers are free
to place their saving (and replace their savings) in tangible
and intangible assets of their choice, the business recipients
of new issue sale proceeds may spend these moneys purchasing new
capital equipment, existing physical assets, reducing debt,
building liquidity balances or any number of other non-GNP
objects. It is absurd to suppose that money is neutral. It was
foolish of the orthodox writers to have become addicted to a
money that can purchase a package of Camel cigarettes but cannot
purchase a three year old camel.
Although these practical shortcomings of the orthodox theory are
crippling, they do not constitute a theoretical rejection of the
orthodox theory. Unsurprisingly, it was Keynes's General Theory
that provided the required theoretical critique. He opened his
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argument with a point which he held in common with the classical
writers. i lo
lL thJt level °f income is assumed to be given we rKev™,
raVof incerest^must"^^ tT *"?? "»" *^ ™l
curve for c^l^orresVnding6« f?£?nt^AtS""2
Figure 4 illustrates this point of agreement. We suppose boththe neoclassical model of supply and demand and Keynes's model
of an entrepreneur economy to be in equilibrium. Saving equalsinvestment at rate of interest R, . From this diagram alone itwould be difficult to determine whether the draftsman were a
neoclassicist or a Keynes real world economist. But it isprecisely at this point, this point of agreement, that "definite
error creeps into the classical theory" (ibid, p. 178). Thistheory, Keynes rightly charged, "neglects the influence of
changes in the level of income" (ibid, p. 179) . Neoclassicaltheory asserts that if the investment demand curve shifted orthe saving curve shifted or if both of these curves shifted "the
new rate of interest will be given by the point of intersection
of the new positions of the two curves" (ibid., p. i 79) .
However, if either the investment or saving curve shifted
society's income would change and it is this, the changed flow
of income, which shatters the orthodox theory of interest. "mtruth, the classical theory has not been alive to the relevance
of changes in the level of income or to the possibility of thelevel of income being actually a function of the rate ofinvestment" (ibid., p. 180)
. The orthodox supply-demand theory
of interest breaks down at this point simply because the "twofunctions in question are not independent" (cw, 13 p 5 38)Autonomous increases (decreases) in the investment demandfunction would, via the multiplier process, increase (decrease)
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^Jd f StaVlng - SlnCe tW° CUrVSS arS "* ^^pe„dentmeans the unc ions used by the classical theory
.. do notfurnish the material for a theory of the rate of interest" few
7. P- 181). stated simply, the orthodox theory does not tellus how the rate of interest is determined.
With the aid of a diagram due to Roy Harrod, Keynes illustratedthe theoretical collapse of the orthodox theory of interest withbut one very simple conceptual experiment. Keynes assumed ashift in the investment demand curve from, say, ia to r4 (Flg3). Neoclassical theory states the new rate of interest willbe given by the intersection of I'd and S at point e. But this
obviously cannot be true for the reduced investment spending
will generate a multiplier contraction of society's income and
^tv^saving. The leftward shift of the investment demandfunction to I
.
wilshift the dependent saving curve leftwardBut how far to the left will the saving curve shift? At whatPoint will the new saving curve intersect the displacedinvestment demand function l'a? The neoclassical theory does notcontain enough data to tell us what its new value will be; and
•
therefore, not knowing [the location of the new s curve]
we do not know at what point the new investment demand schedule
"HI cut it" (ibid., p. 181)
. The egregious failure of orthodoxtheory to survive this simple conceptual experiment constitutes
an absolute denial of its validity when applied to entrepreneur
economies.
Conclusion.
in the opening pages of the General Theory Keynes observed that
of ^he'^^inTempTo^entT^)1 th^tL^^ 1 "^^as involuntary9 une^pl^n't 'i' thfstrfcl slnTe fT", "tna?
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supply creates its own demand in the sense that theaggregate demand price is equal to the aggregate suddIvprice for all levels of output and employment. These threeassumptions, however, all amount to amount to the same thinain the sense that they all stand and fall together, any oneof them logically involving the other two. (ibid., pp. 21-
^ )
Keynes rejected neoclassical macroeconomic theory in tpto.
However, it is interesting to find that he did not reject this
theory on the commonplace ground of flawed logic. Their logic
is impeccable; their assumptions determine their conclusions.
Rather, Keynes dismissed the orthodox theory because their
assumptions and the environmental framework these assumptions
require are not to be found in the real world of modern
industrial-financial capitalism. "There is a difference of the
most fundamental importance between a co-operative economy and
the type of entrepreneur economy in which we actually live" (CW,
29, p. 78). In fact there are numerous "differences of the most
fundamental importance" separating the cooperative and
entrepreneur environments (ibid., pp. 66-102; Torr, 1980, 1988,
Dillard, 1988). Difference so fundamental as to render the
orthodox theory impotent when applied to entrepreneur economies.
Differences so critical that to exercise classical economics on
the playground of an entrepreneur economy would be akin to
playing water polo in a coulee. "Nevertheless the greater part
of classical analysis has been usually applied without
compunction or qualification to an entrepreneur economy" (ibid.
,
p. 78).
The following are but a few of the many environmental
differences which distinguish the neoclassical and entrepreneur
fields of play. (l) ma cooperative economy a firm will hire
a worker if his/her marginal product exceeds the real wage. In
an entrepreneur economy the worker in question will not be hired
unless the entrepreneur's expectation is that the additional
product will be sold at a profit. (2) "Fluctuations in
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employment will primarily depend on fluctuations in aggregate
expenditures relative to aggregate costs. This is the essential
feature of an entrepreneur economy" (ibid., p. 91). The
cooperative economy, on the other hand, is a self-adjusting
system which does not experience fluctuations in aggregate
demand unless a "spanner" has been thrown into the working
mechanisms of the economy. (3) A cooperative economy assumes
that supply creates its own demand while in an entrepreneur
economy "expenditure creates its own income" (ibid., p. 81).
(4) An essential feature of an entrepreneur economy is that
money is capable of purchasing final product as well as things
other than final product. The professors of cooperative economy
economics assume that money is neutral. (5) The nature of
production in a cooperative economy is a case of C—M—C'; of
exchanging commodity or effort for money in order to obtain more
commodity or effort. But the attitude of business in an
entrepreneur economy is M—C—M' ; of parting with money for
commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money" (ibid., pp.
81-82) .
The severely constrained economic environment neoclassical
macroeconomic theory requires bears no relation to the actual
economic environment of modern capitalism. This, in brief, is
the basis of Keynes's detailed critique of orthodox theory.
What Keynes's critique failed to clarify is whether or not
history has ever witnessed an economic environment suitable to
the assumptions, logic and conclusions of this theory. If not,
then neoclassical macroeconomic theory is but a mythical
moraine.
32
NOTES
1. The author is grateful to G. C. Harcourt, Carlos Lopes,
Christopher Marine, Karl McDermott, Larry Neal , Paul Straub,
Christopher Torr and Jose Uribe for the generous help they
provided.
2. All references to Keynes's writings refer to The collfintPH
Writings of John Mavnard KpynPQ
( CW). CW, vol. 5 is the
Treatise on Money, Part T
,
vol. 7 is the General Theory
,
vol 9
his Essay? in Persuasion, vols. 13 and 14 are the General Theory
and After, Parts I and II. Vol. 29 is The General Theory *nri
After, A Supplement. Other references are indicated by author
and date of publication.
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